This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent's level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because it induces the efficient agent to supply the level of safety effort equivalent to the first best solution. The counterpart is the perception of an informational rent by the efficient agent. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal. 
Introduction
In April 2010, the BP's offshore drilling rig explosion spilled crude oil in the Mexico Gulf and polluted it on a large scale. This event reminded us that our contemporaneous industrial societies are highly sensitive to technological hazards. Indeed, productive activities generate potential huge harm with large ripple effects on public health or natural resources.
Governments and corporate managers of risky activities have to find effective tradeoffs between natural resources preservation and economic growth.
From an economic viewpoint, industrial accident are negative externalities that disturb the classical adverse selection problem of "no distortion of the top" put into evidence in the eighties by Maskin and Riley (1984) , (Baron and Myerson (1982) ), (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) , (Myerson, 1981) . These disruptions involve that the most efficient agent cannot get the firstbest outcome. The range of ex-ante and ex-post environmental regulatory instrument defined to overcome this problem is quite wide (see for instance (Kolstad, Uhlen and Johnson, 1991) , (Schmitz, 2000) ). Strict liability regimes are legal instruments usually implemented to protect the environment with twofold objectives: compensating damage and inducing managers to take preventive measures. Strict liability regimes share the same feature in the sense that the proof of any fault is unnecessary to compensate victims. Hence, liability is implied by the mere existence of a causal link between the risky activity and the harm, this, regardless of the level of care the liable agent exercised beforehand. Strict liability means that he must repair the entire damage he caused. Undoubtedly, this regime advantages victims that can access rapidly to compensation without bearing the burden of the proof. However, its main weakness is that redresses amount can exceed the polluter's financial capacities and lead him to become judgment proof (Summers, 1983) , (Shavell, 1986) ). Hence, Society as a whole will endure the cost of the incomplete internalization process.
In spite of this flaw, the present paper revisits the strict liability question. It considers, paradoxically, that putting ceilings to the total amount of repairs can induce efficient agent to offer a first best prevention effort.
More precisely, this contribution compares the relative performance of two civil strict liability regimes: "standard" strict liability and "capped" one. Under a "standard" strict liability scheme, the liable agent must repair the damage in its totality (as, for instance, in the 3 CERCLA 1 scheme or the Environmental liability directive of the EU of 2004 2 , (OECD 2009)). Economics literature calls this case "limited" liability because of the judgment-proof risk (Jost, 1996) , (Segerson and Tietenberg, 1992.) . In the opposite, the Law puts ceiling on the level of repairs in the so-called "capped" strict liability regimes (as in the maritime sector for oil pollution or in the electro-nuclear industry). This is also a limited liability case but polluters' financial resources are preserved.
To deal with the judgment-proof question two options may be considered. The main one shifts the liability burden to vicarious or solvent third parties. Following Shavell (1986) , authors as Pitchford (1995) , Boyer and Laffont (1997) or still Heyes (1996) initiated a huge literature that studies vicarious liability under ex-post liability rules. Recently, Hiriart and Martimort (2006) ) opened this field to criminal liability by combining fines and rewards. Porrini (2006) (2008) explore the relationships of banks and firms under tort law where the decision of the court is random.
Without contesting these views, the present paper explores the much less crowded second option. Boyd and Ingberman (1994) , Dari-Mattiacci (2006) extend the Beard (1991)'s contribution to cap strict liability. They show that capping the repairs amount may induce firms to increase their prevention effort and, then, contribute to improve the social welfare that standard strict liability struggles to meet. Basically, our model assumes double asymmetric information: first, the efficiency in providing safety and, second, the level of wealth between the principal and the agent. Capping strict liability induces the efficient agents to supply the first best solution of the symmetric information under standard strict liability and, this, at the price of a minimized informational rent.
A first paragraph presents some examples of sectors ruled by capped strict liability.
These are mainly the maritime and the electro-nuclear sectors. We will discuss there much more analytically the previous contributions. In a second paragraph, the basic features of the model are given. The first rank level of safety effort under symmetric information for standard strict liability regime is defined. A third paragraph shows that information asymmetry breaks this scheme because efficient agents are deterred to accept the delegation. In a fourth 4 paragraph, capped liability is introduced and we study how first rank level of effort is supplied by the most efficient agent. A fifth paragraph concludes. proposing to raise the cap to $10 billion in the wake of the BP spill with a retroactive effect.
Some considerations about the institutional capping of strict liability
Nowadays, the point is still at stake. Some authors consider that this regime induces operators to lower their safety effort (Faure and Hu, 2006) , (Faure and Wang, 2008) ) because they proportionate it to the level of redress. At a political level, this analysis is echoed by opponents to the introduction of such liability regimes 6 . However, some authors consider that limiting the amount of the polluters' repair may induce them to increase the safety level beyond an optimal level, (Beard 1990) , (Miceli and Segerson, 2003) , (Dari-Mattiacci, 2006) . For instance, this author insists on the tradeoff between the cost of precaution and the amount of wealth dedicated to redress. The liability caps are independent from the injurer's safety expenditures that can contribute to limit excessive precaution and reduce the insolvency risk. Hence, a potential insolvent agent may be induced to take too much precaution compared to the social optimum. This increases the total social costs of accident: the more is spent on prevention, the less for repairs.
Bounding the liability allows the injurers to spare more for compensation (Dari-Mattiacci, 2006 ). When they consider the social optimum, these articles do not take into consideration potential victims and limit it to the polluter's welfare. In the present paper, potential victims are considered through the principal that acts as their representative. Hence, the question of 6 the "under investment" or the "over-investment" in safety does not arise in the same terms. In the opposite, in the following we show that this kind of regime can improve the situation of both agents and the representative of the Society (The principal).
Economic environment: technology, preferences, information
This paper borrows the methodology of asymmetric information theory. However, basically, it rests on the foundations of liability theory developed by Shavell (1986) . Indeed, we consider that agents focus on safety level mainly. That means that reference to the quantity supply question is only implicit. Indeed, we consider that agents differ only by the marginal costs of their safety effort. That means that regarding quantities, the principal considers that the marginal production costs of gross production are almost identical. Putting it otherwise, production technologies are roughly similar but differ mainly by the level of care brought by the agent. Hence, the RA knows that agents compete about safety which is reflected in differentiated marginal costs. This state of matter is a common feature considering most modern products and production because knowledge about basic technology is available everywhere. For instance, if cars have similar basic structure, however, brands differ in their specific embedded equipment about safety or quality (see for instance, (Gabszewicz, and Thisse,1979) , (Tirole,1988, chap.7) , (Tay 2003) , (Toshimitsu and Jinji, 2007) . Every Nation knows how to produce basic cars, but only few among them can control safety equipments.
This observation extends for most goods or services as, for instance, nuclear power plants or delegated water services. Nowadays, for most products and production, competition bears more on quality than on the question of quantity.
Consequently, in order to assess a relevant level of transfers to pay for safety (as an can compare and even check the set of safety equipments from a brand to another one and can accept to pay more or less according the sophistication degree of a model. However, it is difficult to appreciate the effective producer's skill for a specific car model. This is the root of asymmetric information in our model. Hence, if the principal can accede to the level of agents' safety effort, he cannot appreciate their effective skill. The more efficient an agent is, the lowest his safety marginal costs.
General feature of the model
A Regulatory Agency (RA) or Principal wants to delegate to the private sector the production of a public good. This activity can induce severe harm to the Environment and/or public Health. Besides the product, the RA needs also an optimal safety level (for instance good water quality or safe electro-nuclear power, or still good conditions for oil transportation.). The Principal derives a benefit ܵሺ݁ሻ from the acquisition of the good provided that it ensures an adequate level of security e. ܵሺ݁ሻ is defined on ℝ with ܵ We will analyze respectively both regimes the strict liability one and the capped one.
The last one puts ceilings of the level of repairs. Let ‫ݕ‬ be the level of the agent's wealth, and ‫ܦ‬ the level of damage (where ‫ݕ‬ < ‫)ܦ‬ if major accident occurs. Hence, the damage costs exceed the agent's financial capacities. Under a standard liability regime, if a benevolent Court considers the agent as liable, he will have to pay on his own assets. However, if his wealth is insufficient for full repairs, he becomes judgment proof (Summers, 1983) , (Shavell, 1986) ). Under a capped liability scheme, the amount of damage is fixed to ‫,ܥ‬ where ‫ܥ‬ < ‫ܦ‬ and liable agents escape the judgment-proof situation. The potential damage ‫ܦ‬ of the activity is common knowledge as the probability distribution of the environmental harm ‫‬ሺ݁ሻ where ‫‬ ᇱ < 0 and ‫‬ ᇱᇱ > 0.
Informational asymmetries are two: i) the level of safety effort and ii) the agent's wealth that cannot be considered as public information. Compared to models that deals with 8 liability and competition, as (Pitchford, 1995) , (Laffont and Boyer (1997) , (Boyd and Ingerman, 1997) , (Hiriart and Martimort, 2006) , we dissociate the level of safety effort from the efficiency about the skill of the firm in its management of safety.
The utility functions of the RA and the Agent
When the RA acquires the public good, he requires also a given level of safety and the RA's utility function is:
Where, ‫ݐ‬ is the payment made to the agent by the RA, ‫ݐ‬ has to be high enough to cover the costs induced by the production activity and the safety effort. If ܷ is the profit function of the agent:
This writing means that the agent assesses both cost of safety and he has to internalize the possible damage to the environment ‫ܭ‬ሺ݁ሻ where ‫ܭ‬ = ‫,ܥ{‬ ‫}ݕ‬ is the amount of the redress under a capped strict liability regime for a fixed amount ‫ܥ‬ and a ‫ݕ‬ (the amount of his wealth)
for a "standard" strict liability. The value ߠ stands for the marginal cost of safety efforts made by the agent where ߠ ∈ ൛ߠ, ߠൟ with ߠ (respectively ߠ) the marginal safety effort cost of the efficient (resp. inefficient) agent). As agent's efficiency is private information, the RA assesses the following probability distribution on the distribution between efficient agent (ϑሻ and inefficient ones (1 − ϑ), ( 1 ≥ ϑ ≥ 0).
We can define the firm's cost function considering the possibility of the occurrence of a severe accident (probability ‫‬ሺ݁ሻ). The expected cost of safety writes now: ‫ܥ‬ሺߠ, ݁, ‫ܭ‬ሻ = ߠ݁ ൫1 − ‫‬ሺ݁ሻ൯ + ሺߠ݁ + ‫ܭ‬ሻ‫‬ሺ݁ሻ [3] Or, after developing:
For ߠ ∈ ൣߠ, ߠ൧ and ‫ܭ‬ = ‫,ܥ{‬ ‫}ݕ‬ And the profit function becomes:
We deduce the society's welfare function: ܹ = U + V = ܵሺ݁ሻ − ߠ݁ − ‫‬ሺ݁ሻ‫ܦ‬ for ߠ ∈ ൣߠ, ߠ൧ 7 [6] 7 See appendix 9
We can notice that this function is such that ܹ ᇱ ሺ݁ሻ > 0, ܽ݊݀ ܹ"ሺ݁ሻ > 0, this becauseܵ ᇱ ሺ݁ሻ > 0, ‫ܦ‬ > 0 ܽ݊݀ ‫‬ ᇱ ሺ݁ሻ > 0. As for standard asymmetric information theory we can define the contracting outcome: the relevant variables are the level of effort ݁ necessary to achieve an acceptable level of safety and the transfer ‫ݐ‬ received by the agentt. Let Ξ the set of feasible allocations that is given by: ߌ = ൛ሺ݁, ‫ݐ‬ሻ: ݁ ∈ ℝ ା, ‫ݐ‬ ∈ ℝ , ൟ These variables are both observable and verifiable by a third party such as a benevolent court of law. Hence, the effective informational asymmetries are the agent's level of wealth and his efficiency level of safety. This extends the models of Shavell (1984 Shavell ( ), (1986 Shavell ( ), (1987 or Landes and Posner (1989) to informational asymmetries.
The Complete Information Optimal Contract
a) The first-best safety level
We assume first that there is no information asymmetry between the principal and the agent (either in efficiency or in wealth). Then, the RA can perform an appropriate transfer. (Proof in appendix).
This relationship involves that the social value of the protection level is higher when the agent is efficient than when it is not.
b) Implementing the first-best
For a successful delegation of the task, the principal has to offer the agent a utility level that is at least as high as the level the agent obtains outside the relationship. These are the agent's participation constraints. Then, the quo-utility level or participation constraints write as:
To implement the first-best production levels, the principal makes a contract of a takeit or leave-it type to the agent and supply a ൫‫ݐ‬ * , ݁ * ൯-contract for the efficient agent ሺߠ) or a ൫‫ݐ‬ * , ݁ * ൯-contract for the inefficient one ሺߠሻ. Hence, under symmetric information assumption, the principal needs to know perfectly the agent's wealth level to perform an appropriate payment. Indeed, the transfer ‫ݐ‬ includes both the safety price and the risk cover.
Asymmetric information and information rents: the case of standard strict liability
Now, we analyze the situation characterized by information asymmetries (efficiency and wealth) between the RA and the agent in a standard strict liability framework. Hence, if he is found liable for the harm, the agent will have to repair it by engaging the whole of his assets.
The agent program under standard strict liability
The agent knows privately both how efficient he is and his wealth level. These values are ignored by the principal. Then, he has to design an incentive mechanism that will reveal this double information. Conform to standard asymmetric information theory (LaffontMartimort, 2002, chap. 2)), a menu of contracts ࣝ = ൛൫‫,ݐ‬ ݁൯, ሺ‫,ݐ‬ ݁ሻ ൟ is incentive compatible when ൫‫,ݐ‬ ݁൯ is weakly preferred to ሺ‫,ݐ‬ ݁ሻ by the agent ߠ and ሺ‫,ݐ‬ ݁ሻ is weakly preferred to ൫‫,ݐ‬ ݁൯
by the agent ߠ. This involves that the following constraints (incentive compatibility constraints) have to be respected:
A supplementary condition is that participation constraints have to be respected too:
The menu of contracts is incentive feasible if the constraints [12] to [15] are satisfied.
Contracts in ࣝ are truthful, i.e. the firm is induced to report its true technological parameters.
We define the information rents of the agent of each type as:
Then we can define the amount that an efficient agent can capture by mimicking an inefficient agent. However, the risk question makes this point more delicate. Hence, if the efficient agent can mimic the ߠ agent by adapting its supply of security service, a priori, he cannot imitate the ߠ agent's level of wealth ‫ݕ‬ which is unknown to him... Furthermore, in the case of an accident, his effective wealth will be engaged. Hence, the informational rent depends only on the level of supplied safety which expresses as:
Or, still: negative. Indeed, we cannot postulate that the efficient agent has to be richer than the inefficient one or the reverse. The consequences of both designs have to be discussed.
The program of the principal under standard strict liability
To overcome the uncertainty induced by informational asymmetries, the principal offers a menu of contracts. Before defining his complete program, we have to define the regulator's expected gain which expresses as: ሺܵሺ݁ሻ − ‫ݐ‬ሻ൫1 − ‫‬ሺ݁ሻ൯ + ൫ܵሺ݁ሻ − ‫ݐ‬ − ሺ‫ܦ‬ − ‫ݕ‬ሻ൯‫‬ሺ݁ሻ = ܵሺ݁ሻ − ሺ‫ܦ‬ − ‫ݕ‬ሻ‫‬ሺ݁ሻ − ‫ݐ‬ Then, taking into account the nature of the agent, the principal's program writes as:
Subject to the constraints [12] to [15] .
Considering the information rents ܷ = ‫ݐ‬ − ܿሺߠ , ݁, ‫ݕ‬ሻ and ܷ = ‫ݐ‬ − ܿሺߠ, ݁, ‫ݕ‬ሻ.
We can replace the value of the transfers by the information rents, and, then, the program becomes: [20] Subject to the incentive constraints:
And the participation constraints:
The principal aims first at maximizing the net safety surplus and, second, minimizing the information rents. In general, following standard presentation (Laffont-Martimort, 2002) , finding solution to this program involves choosing the relevant constraints, i.e. the binding ones at the optimum. Hence, the relevant constraints are reduced from four to two: the incentive constraint of the efficient agent and the participation constraint of the ߠ agent. Now, taking into account the severe accident occurrence, this simplification has to be made cautiously because the agent's wealth is privately known and this adds a supplementary uncertainty.
Proposition 2:
Considering standard strict liability regime, when the probability of severe accident with social impact (health or environment) is introduced, the revelation mechanism depends on the wealth of each category's of agent. Considering the program [20] to [15'] , the necessary condition for solving it is that ‫ݕ‬ > ‫.ݕ‬ (Proof in appendix).
This proposition means that when the inefficient agent is richer than the efficient one, then the usual mechanism that involves that efficient agent will supply the first best level of effort does not work anymore. Indeed, [26] These results differ slightly with standard asymmetric information theory. They call for some remarks.
Remark 1: It is legitimate to consider that ∆ߠ = ߠ − ߠ > 0, that expresses the difference in efficiency of agent ߠ compared to agent ߠ considering marginal costs. However, there is no economic legitimacy putting ‫ݕ∆‬ = ‫ݕ‬ − ‫ݕ‬ > 0 (or the reverse) as an assumption.
Proposition 2 results from a strong assumption. However, in general, there is no economic reason to consider that the efficient agent should be richer than the inefficient one or the reverse.
Remark 2:
We can check that the informational rent of the efficient agent is positive
If this condition is not met, then the value of the informational rent can be weak.
Concretely, this condition means that the difference between the efforts brought by the efficient agent compared to the inefficient one, has to be higher than
Remark 3: Under a standard strict liability regime under an asymmetric information assumption, the efficient agents may be deterred to enter in the game. Indeed, two conditions have to be met to induce him to compete. The first one is necessary but insufficient (proposition 1) i.e. his level of wealth has to be higher than the one of the inefficient agent.
The other condition, (sufficient) is that the level of safety effort has to be high enough such that the difference in the probability of accident will exceed
We have to underline that this condition is particularly stringent because the efficient agent must know too much information before accepting the delegation. Indeed, the efficient agent cannot know the nature of his opponent's wealth.
Remark 4:
The constraint [13'] (ܷ ≧ ܷ − ∆ߠ݁ + ∆‫ݕ‬ሺ݁ሻ) means that the inefficient agent claims that he is efficient but he will fail to supply the promised level of safety. This is typically an adverse selection problem. However, it cannot be solved here because instruments that could induce the efficient agent to overcome his reluctance to produce when conditions are not favorable are lacking.
As a conclusion, standard strict liability is not a powerful instrument to protect public health and the environment. This result has long been known (Shavell, 1986) ) and asymmetric information reinforce the point. We show furthermore that uncertainty about wealth level under this regime tends to favor the adverse selection effect. This state of matter introduces biases in the calculus of the efficient agent. 
The Capped strict liability scheme and asymmetric information
In this paragraph two points will be discussed: first, the way to get an acceptable solution for the strict liability scheme and second, the consequences for a better involving of associated financing institution. Hence capped liability allow to secure investment and makes easier insuring investment. [44] (Proof is deduced from the previous argument).
The ceiling of liability allows dropping the unknown level of wealth. Indeed, by [29] and [30] the value of the ceiling replaces the agent's wealth. Hence, the problem reduces to only one private information variable: the safety effort efficiency. The result that follows is quite standard. Under the ceiling of redress, the level of precautionary effort of the most efficient agent corresponds to the first rank of the symmetric information scheme. The counterpart is that this agent benefits of an informational rent that, however, is minimized by the optimal contract between the RA and the efficient agent.
Capped liability and insurance: an introduction
Conversely to a well shared opinion, the above results show that ceiling the redress level leads neither to overinvest in safety effort nor to under-invest in it if the principal can impact on the level of safety. Under asymmetric information, putting caps on redress issues on the same level of effort than the delegation of the risky activity under both symmetric information and the standard strict liability regime. After this initial result, many avenues must be explored. For instance, we have not addressed the issue of insurance which for capped liability is an important matter (Shavell, 2005) , (Boyd and Ingerman, 1997) ). For instance, it is compulsory for oil operators in the maritime sector and the nuclear industry to subscribe insurance against technological risk. In this paper, we have limited our concern to study the scope and power of the ex-post regulatory control based on the ceiling of redress under informational asymmetries on agent's wealth and efficiency.
By fixing the ceiling of the redress, the RA reduces the uncertainty involved by the unknown wealth of polluters. Furthermore, the RA can control the agent's activity by by demanding that candidates to delegation should own at least the amount of the cap as financial guarantee. This induces insufficient funded agents to withdraw. This may be done either on the own assets of the agent or by the help of an insuring company. For instance, if Q is that level that is insured, where:
‫ܥ‬ − ܳ = ‫ݓ‬ ‫ݓ(‬ is this share of the agent's wealth which is used as commitment). As a consequence, the agent has to cope with two principals: the RA and the insurance company.
Indeed, we can consider that the insurance premium is equivalent to ܳ‫‬ሺ݁ሻ = ݉, that is to say the probability of an accident by the claim of the company. As a result, to reduce his premium the agent has to increase his level of effort. Indeed, the insurance company has to check that 18 the level of safety corresponds to the level of the insurance premium. A next step will be to develop these relationships.
Conclusion
Under asymmetric information, standard strict liability rules fail to provide the first best level of safety effort. This favors adverse selection emergence and can induce inefficient firms to undertake risky activities by deterring the efficient ones. Capped strict liability may be an alternative to strict liability. However, this switching does not guarantee automatically restoring efficiency. Indeed, some necessary conditions have to be fulfilled.
In real life, as far as informed people perceive that the ceiling is insufficient, capped strict liability raise strong opposition. In this paper we showed that, under asymmetric information, the Principal has to formulate relevant contracts that put together caps and level of safety effort. These contracts are second best contracts compared to the certain case under strict liability, but they adjust the level of safety to the level of the cap. At the equilibrium level, the level of care has to be chosen such that the marginal costs of care are offset by marginal reductions in expected damages. To be fully efficient, a capped strict liability scheme needs to associate the utility level of the principal to a relevant level of security. This involves establishing a tradeoff between a relevant safety effort and its associated costs and the level of redress designed by the level of the cap. Indeed, this tradeoff balances the risk level that the principal can accept and the amount of the fund dedicated to repairs.
Capping the repairs level does not remove the judgment-proof question even if an efficient contract is formulated. However, it locks up the debate by explicitly involving all the parties. Hence, at the equilibrium, implicitly, the principal accepts incomplete repairs but the potential loss is balanced by an increase in safety. These one consists in two points. First, the equilibrium level of effort is calculated on the whole cost of damage that the society can endure. The effort level is identical to the one of the certainty case reached under strict liability. Second, the contract attracts the safety efficient agent and avoids the adverse selection effect. This eviction effect of safety inefficient agent can be reinforced by the requirement of insurance policy that introduces a new principal in the scheme.
